Some post

Looking at the just-concluded General Election as a veteran Member of Parliament who had given way for new blood, my feelings were rather different from when I was a candidate myself. When you were in the thick of a election campaign - fighting tooth and nail with your opponent and canvassing for voter support - it was easy to lose sight of changes in the big picture. This time round, I was able to take a more detached view.

　　As I see it, the loose alliance of some opposition parties was a far cry from the ruling People's Action Party's well-thought-out and highly flexible gameplan. Even on Nomination Day itself, it was clear that the line-up from the opposition could hardly pose a serious challenge to the PAP.

　　The PAP had long done its calculation, or what was called “miao suan” （in ancient times, before going to battles, meetings must be held in a temple to map out the war plans and assess the chances of a victory or defeat） and knew what it had to do to secure a victory. The opposition, on the other hand, was represented by a motley group of people, a loose alliance and also lacked unity.

　　The ruling party had obviously taken into consideration the timing and feelings of the people. In addition to the re-drawing of electoral boundaries and the calling of a snap election, it did away with the four-member Group Representation Constituencies to provide for mega constituencies - the five or six-member GRCs - a move that sent the opposition into disarray.

　　The PAP had its finger on the pulse of every constituency and was able to fine-tune its strategies with ease. For instance, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong gave the initial impression that he was not keen on wrestling Potong Pasir and Hougang back from the opposition, thus lowered the guard of their incumbents.

　　But with an opportunity created by Chee Soon Juan halfway through the hustings, he changed tactics and started wooing voters in the two opposition strongholds. That put Chiam See Tong and Low Thia Khiang on the defensive.

　　Meanwhile, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Nee Soon East to perform a “surgery” for the single-member constituency. The ward was like a patient suffering from acute appendicitis, but was back in the pink of health immediately after the “operation”。 The result： the expected close fight fizzled out and it ceased to be a hot spot.

　　The strategies employed by the PAP were executed superbly. The small number of opposition candidates and constituencies contested was also a key reason why the PAP was able to display its political skills with finesse.

　　The September 11 tragedy and the recession worked to the advantage of the PAP, but the “by-election effect” did not materialise for the opposition. The reason was simple： There were few credible candidates in the opposition camp. In other words, the quality of the candidates was the decisive factor.

　　The PAP might have scored a landslide victory with a higher percentage of valid votes, but it still failed to win back Potong Pasir and Hougang. And though the share of valid votes for Mr Chiam and Mr Low both saw a drop, the fact that they managed to retain their seats in spite of the unfavourable conditions was already quite a feat.

　　Their triumphs also proved the importance of having capable candidates. They are both considered competent by voters and they had also proven themselves capable of delivering. In spite of the lure of upgrading, voters chose to give the two opposition MPs a fair chance. This showed that they were not only rational but were also “loyal”。

　　（The writer is a former MP for Marine Parade GRC.Translated by Yap Gee Poh）

　　我看这次大选● 吴俊刚

　　这次大选,我以退役老兵的心情观战,别有一番感受。置身其中,鏖战前线,在一个选区范围内冲锋陷阵,往往看不到大棋局的变幻。这回就不同了。

　　我觉得,这回大选,执政党的布局非常严密,兼之变化灵活,确乎不是*的松散联盟所能望其项背的。提名当天,两军对立,我们马上就可以看出,双方势力悬殊。

　　一方是早已作了庙算（古时候兴师作战,要在庙堂举行会议,谋划作战大计,预计战争胜负,这就叫庙算）,成竹在胸,一方则是临时拼凑,松散结盟,也无法做到全面团结。

　　执政党很显然的是把天时、地利和人和三大因素都考虑到了,除了闪电出击,重划选区,也派出了一队“奇兵”,那就是去掉四人集选区,增加六人和五人集选区。这使得*阵营仓皇失措,阵脚大乱。

　　提名过后,行动党很显然的也密切关注各区选情的变化,并在及时调整战略方面表现了极大的灵活性。比方,开始时,吴总理谈笑用兵,给人的印象是他并不想夺回波东巴西和后港,使对手放松了警戒。

　　竞选中途,战略突然改变,借用徐顺全提供的一个天赐缺口,转而集中火力猛攻这两个*堡垒。迫使詹时中和刘程强不得不掉转马头,保卫各自的据点。

　　与此同时,李资政亲身出马,到义顺东替这个单选区做了一场“手术”。这个单选区就像患上急性盲肠炎的病人,手术过后,马上化险为夷,使到行动党能够把战线拉短,而且转移热点。

　　行动党在这次大选中各种选战战术的运用,可以说是发挥得淋漓尽致。而*参选范围小,人数少,则是行动党在变化战术上能够如此得心应手的关键因素。

　　尽管九一一和经济危机等因素对执政党有利,*竞选人数减少,却完全没有发挥补选的效应。为什么？一言以蔽之,*阵营人才凋零。换言之,人才是最后的决定因素。

　　选战结果,尽管行动党总的得票率提高,它还是无法夺回波东巴西和后港两区。这两区的*在任议员得票率固然是下降了,但是,在大环境极为不利的情形下,他们能有如次战果,已算是难能可贵了。

　　这其实也可以反证人才的重要性。他们是选民认同的*人才。他们在任期内也证明能替选民办事,选民铭记在心,即使有翻新计划的诱惑,大部分人还是选择给詹、刘二人一个公平的机会。看来,选民不仅是理智的,也很讲义气哩。

　　。作者为马林百列集选区前议员